When temporary spent fuel storage pools at nuclear power plants reach their capacity limit, the spent fuel must be moved to an alternative storage facility. However, radioactive materials must be handled and stored carefully to avoid severe consequences to the environment. In this study, the risks of three potential accident scenarios (i.e., maritime transportation, an aircraft crashing into an interim storage facility, and on-site transportation) associated with the spent fuel transportation process were analyzed using a probabilistic approach. For each scenario, the probabilities and the consequences were calculated separately to assess the risks: the probabilities were calculated using existing data and statistical models, and the consequences were calculated using computation models. Risk assessment software was developed to conveniently integrate the three scenarios. The risks were analyzed using the developed software according to the shipment route, building characteristics, and spent fuel handling environment. As a result of the risk analysis with varying accident conditions, transportation and storage strategies with relatively low risk were developed for regulators and licensees. The focus of this study was the risk assessment methodology; however, the applied model and input data have some uncertainties. Further research to reduce these uncertainties will improve the accuracy of this model.
Introduction
As the capacity of spent fuel pools at reactors approaches its limit, an alternative facility must be planned and built in the Republic of Korea [1] . The current on-site spent fuel pools are expected to become saturated in 2024 [2] . Therefore, spent fuel must be transported to another location, such as an off-site interim storage facility (ISF), disposal site, or overseas reprocessing facility. If spent fuel is transported to another location, the transportation process must be strictly controlled to avoid the release of radioactive material. Any release of radioactive material can severely impact the environment and the human population. Although radioactive materials can be released as part of various natural events such as earthquakes, fires, or floods, the research scope of this study was restricted to accidents in spent fuel transportation and storage because of the severity of these accidents [3] .
The risks associated with the transportation and storage of spent fuel have been analyzed primarily in the United States. Because the United States covers a large land area, these assessments have focused on on-site, rail, and road transportation [4e6] . In addition, risks from drop and aircraft crash accidents were analyzed for different cask models under several hypothetical accident scenarios [7, 8] . Risks of accidents for dry storage scenarios were also investigated according to various accident conditions [9] . Locally, a few studies analyzed the risk from cask or packaging integrity loss rather than from accident scenarios for spent fuel transportation and storage [10e14] .
However, the transportation process for spent fuels in Korea will be unlike the processes in other countries because of the small territory, brittle bridge structures, and coastal locations of nuclear power plants (NPPs) [15] . Because all Korean NPPs are located in coastal areas, the transportation of spent fuel by ship is more reasonable than that by train or trailer. Therefore, maritime transportation of spent fuel to another storage facility is a practical option. However, there have been relatively few studies for maritime transportation compared to land transportation. One study examined this topic assuming a collision and fire scenario, whereas another study assessed the individual dose assuming a submerging scenario for maritime transportation [16, 17] .
Although several previous studies have researched spent fuel transportation and storage, their approaches were based on deterministic methods. In this research, we propose probabilistic-based methods by developing accident scenarios for spent fuel transportation and storage. Therefore, the goal of the current study is to develop new probabilistic-based methodologies for three potential accident scenarios and to integrate these into a software toolbox so as to provide useful information for regulators and licensees.
Methods
Eq. (1), which is generally used for risk calculations, was used to calculate the risk associated with transporting spent fuel. Because this fundamental equation was used to calculate the risk of all three accident scenarios, the probabilities and the consequences were calculated separately. Then, accident scenarios necessary for the risk calculation were developed for all three accidents, as shown in the event tree format in the following sections.
Risk ¼ Probability Â Consequence (1)
Maritime transportation
Because Korean NPPs are located in coastal areas, most of the spent fuel will be transported by ship. Therefore, maritime transportation will be the most likely transport option. In this study, a cell-based method was used to analyze the risk of a maritime transportation accident. As shown in Fig. 1 , the Korean ocean was divided into several square cells that were 0.5 on each side. This cell size was chosen because local oceanographic observation data were obtained at a resolution of 0.5 [18] . Thus, the input data for MARINRAD, such as the ocean dispersion coefficients and food chain coefficients, were readily integrated into the model at this cell size [19, 20] . By excluding the Japanese and Chinese oceans from the analysis so as to avoid legal conflicts, the minimum marine boundary of Korea was used for this study. The region of interest is shown in Fig. 1 as a shaded zone.
The analysis was based on a route that can be freely drawn; a route that crosses several cells was treated as the basic unit for the analysis. The probability and the consequence were calculated based on cells. Therefore, the probability of a freely drawn route must be converted to a cell-based probability. Because each cell has its own event tree, the probabilities and the consequences of these local event trees can be reflected in the final result. This approach provides an advantage to users who notice hazardous cells: they can adjust their routes accordingly.
Ship collisions have been the most frequent type of marine accident in South Korea for the past three decades, as shown in the 2015 update of the marine accident data of Korea Marine Institute [21] . Moreover, because collision accidents can induce other accidents, collision accidents were considered the most hazardous accident in this study. Therefore, a ship collision model was adopted from Christian and Kang [22] . The collision scenario was classified into three categories according to the angle of the encounter: crossing, head-on, and overtaking. The collision probability was calculated as a combination of the geometrical encounter probability assuming a blind navigation scheme and the failure probability to evade such an encounter:
where P is the ship-to-ship collision probability, P G is the geometrical collision probability, and P C is the probability of failing to avoid the collision. P G was calculated separately for each collision type; in general, this was a function of the encounter angle, the geometry of the ships, the traffic density, and the time spent at a route intersection. Marine traffic was simulated using the 2014 automatic identification system data [21e24]. The code created marine traffic routes and estimated the type and location of intersections between the traffic and a spent nuclear fuel (SNF) carrier. Traffic uncertainties at these intersections were addressed using the Monte Carlo method for the probability densities of the ship dimensions and velocity. P C was taken from a literature study and had a constant value based on the collision type [25] . As shown in Fig. 2 , the striking ship must have enough energy to sufficiently penetrate the SNF ship and to damage the transport casks on board. Therefore, the mechanical analysis model by Christian and Kang [26] was adopted to estimate penetration distance as a function of energy angle and location of impact. In their model, the impact energy, obtained from equations of rigid body dynamics, is contested to the SNF ship's strength; this strength profile is generally understood as the resistance to penetration and was estimated using nonlinear finite element analysis. The cask damage probability was then calculated based on the likelihood of there being a geometrical contact between the transport cask and the striking ship's bow given a specific penetration distance.
Christian and Kang [26] considered variations of ship strength to impact location along the SNF ship. Therefore, their model requires multiple finite element analyses at impact locations along the SNF ship's cargo holds to obtain an exhaustive strength profile. This task required lengthy computation time and tedious labor. To overcome this difficulty, an automation scheme was devised, as shown in Fig. 3 . The overall flowchart and explanation of the integration of ABAQUS (Abaqus, Inc., United States; available through Dassault Syst emes, www.3ds.com), MATLAB (www.mathworks.com), and Python (www.python.org) are shown in this figure to explain the automation procedure.
An initial collision simulation case was designed using ABAQUS finite element method (FEM) software, and this was converted to a master input file [26e28]. By changing the original impact locations to predefined sample points, a MATLAB script was created to read this file and to generate various input files. This script, called ABAQUS, fed these input files sequentially for execution, and continuously monitored the binary output file. The script fed this binary output to a custom Python code to convert it into a text file. Then, the Python code read the striking ship's penetration distance and loss of kinetic energy from this text file. The strength data were "stitched" together by linearly interpolating the strength at impact locations between the sample points.
Executable MATLAB-based software was developed to input an SNF shipment route and to calculate the probabilities of ship collision and transport cask damage at each intersection. Because of the stringent transportation safety regulations, it was assumed that any collision would stop the shipment process to allow for regulatory intervention measures. Therefore, the collision probability at an intersection was compounded by the probability of an SNF ship arriving safely at that intersection. This software, termed support software, received the geographical cell grid data from the main software, which was called the "risk assessment program for spent fuel transportation and storage" (RATS). The collision probability and cask damage probability within a cell were sequentially compounded by the support software according to the order of encounters within that cell. Then, the main software used these data to compute the cell risk using Eq. (1) .
For the consequence analysis, the source term of the radioactive materials was obtained using the ORIGEN-ARP (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, web.ornl.gov/origen-arp/) code. The conditions were varied for several runs, and the results were saved in the software database. Then, MARINRAD (https://rsicc.ornl.gov/codes/ccc/ccc5/ ccc-503.html), a code used to assess the consequences of radioactive material releases into the ocean, was imbedded into the software for consequence analysis [29] . The source term data from ORIGEN, the coefficients related to ocean dispersion and the food chain model, and the coefficients related to dose conversion, were required for the input data. From the source term and the coefficients for dispersion and the food chain, the concentration and concentration factor were calculated as intermediate results in MARINRAD. Then, the human dose was assessed using these intermediate results.
Because MARINRAD was developed in 1987, the default data in this software had to be updated, and some input data were changed to reflect local ocean characteristics. Eqs. (3) and (4) were used for individual dose calculation in MARINRAD [29] . The local ocean coefficients used to calculate the concentration of compartments were obtained from a nautical chart published by the Korea Hydrographic and Oceanographic Agency [20] . In addition, the coefficients related to the concentration factor were obtained from the ICRP [30] , and the dose factor was updated with recent data [31] . The coefficients for the cask characteristics were changed according to the accident condition by combining MARINRAD and the developed software. The revised input data were used in Eq. (3) to calculate the individual dose, as follows: 
where H ðNÞ mp ðtÞ represents the health effects in compartment m for pathway p and radionuclide N at time t, HF is the health effects conversion factor, and D ðNÞ mp ðtÞ is defined by Eq. (3).
Aircraft crash into a spent fuel ISF
Despite the low probability of an intentional aircraft crash into an ISF, this scenariodbecause of its high consequencesdmust be considered a major contributor to the risk associated with spent fuel storage [4] . After the tragic attacks on September 11, 2001 , some studies evaluated the intentional crash of a commercial aircraft into an NPP containment [32, 33] . These studies required the quantification and assessment of the risk associated with an aircraft crash. However, the probability of an aircraft crash is very difficult to address because of many unforeseen factors including security issues and the inherent uncertainties for an undecided ISF site. Therefore, this study assumed that the frequency of an aircraft crash is equal to 1 as a conditional probability with quantifying the capability of the storage facility to withstand the possible impact loads and to prevent significant release of the spent fuel materials owing to an aircraft crash. In this case, the relation between the mechanical behavior of the cask and the radiological consequence analysis was assessed [34] .
For an aircraft crash into an ISF, as shown in Fig. 4 , the probability of each sequence line is the product of the probability of penetrating the facility walls under the local mechanical impact load induced by the impact of an aircraft engine, the probability of impact orientation onto the cask body, and the probability of status of the cask response; these factors are termed recoverable damage, seal damage, and cask damage.
The probability of the release of radioactive material is affected by the impact energy. The impact energy must be adequate to break the facility wall and a cask body. For a conservative analysis, this study assumed that the casks are subjected to the impact of a jet engine. Therefore, the impact energy of the engine on a storage cask body was expressed as a function of the residual velocity that remained after penetrating the wall. The range of impact energy depends on the facility wall thickness and the compressive strength of the reinforced concrete in the wall.
However, the aircraft impact speed and the concrete strength of the facility walls are major sources of uncertainty. The aircraft impact speed is dependent on many factors such as the topography surrounding the site and the size of the target, whereas the concrete wall strength depends on the concrete batch properties during fabrication and the degradation caused by ambient environmental changes. Thus, the compressive concrete strength was modeled as a log-normal distribution, and the aircraft speed was assumed to be normally distributed. Using these distribution models for the uncertainties, the Monte Carlo technique was used to calculate the penetration probability. Based on the determined options for the aircraft velocity and the wall strength, the distributions of the residual velocity and perforation probability were determined.
Five impact locations of a cask were considered in the impact analysis, as shown in Fig. 5 . The probabilities of impact for each location were equally set to one-fifth. After impact, cask states (i.e., recoverable damage, seal damage, and cask containment damage) were defined and probabilities were determined for the accident sequences.
To analyze the consequences, a release fraction must be calculated from the beginning. The radioactive material inventory was computed using ORIGEN-ARP of SCALE v.6.1.3 to calculate the source terms for each scenario. Using the release fraction combined with meteorological data, the consequences were analyzed assuming the Gaussian plume model for dispersion. Because radiological materials are easily generated and dispersed through the air, the consequences of suspended radioactive materials on humans and the environment were critical in the analysis.
The airborne release fraction was the release fraction of radioactive material from the cask to the environment. The release fraction was calculated using Eq. (5):
where ARF C-E is the airborne release fraction from the rod to the cask cavity, RF is the respirable fraction of the aerosolized radionuclides, ARF R-C is the airborne release fraction from the cask cavity to outside the cask containment, FDR is the fuel damage ratio of the material, and LPF is the leak path factor, which represents the fraction of airborne material released from the containment building [34] . ARF C-E Â RF was calculated based on the leakage area; ARF R-C was taken from previous studies; FDR was calculated; and LRF was assumed to be 1. Therefore, the leakage area had to be calculated to obtain the release fraction. A FEM model of a cask was built using the LS-DYNA code (Livermore Software Technology Corp., United States, www. lstc.com) to calculate the leakage area. The casks consisted of a carbon steel cask body and a lid that was attached by bolts. A release of radioactive material can occur when the bolts are loosened, creating a gap between the lid and the cask body.
The leakage area was calculated for five impact locations according to the impact conditions. After calculating the release fractions, meteorological data were used to assess the consequences. Dispersal assuming a Gaussian plume model was developed in HOTSPOT v.3.0.2 to calculate the total effective dose equivalent along the plume centerline. The Gaussian plume model was adopted for this study because it is a typical model for general cases [35] . This plume model has been used for other analyses to verify the effects of other parameters [36e38].
Along with the dispersal model, meteorological data are essential. The meteorological characteristics of Korea were discussed in several references, and other studies compared the PUFF model with the Lagrangian model for various conditions for a specific site [39e43]. These sophisticated dispersal models require the real meteorological characteristics for the site. Instead of performing analysis with these models, a typical Gaussian dispersion model with a minimal consideration of site characteristics has been used as a preliminary analysis because the consequence analysis was performed for a hypothetical ISF site in this study. Despite the limitations of the Gaussian plume model, such as constant meteorological condition, flat topography, and straight line plume trajectory, the dispersion estimates were determined using the Gaussian plume model so as to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed risk framework in the software. Once the real site is determined, the methodology of consequence analysis can be upgraded in the software.
For the dispersal analysis, hourly recorded wind speed and direction data for 1 year were used as the meteorological data for a hypothetical site [44] . Spatiotemporal wind field changes have been considered in this analysis. The reference person was assumed to breathe at 1.5 m above the ground level with a breathing rate of 3.47 Â10 À4 m 3 /s. Three site boundaries of interest were selected:
the exclusion area boundary at 560 m, a low population zone at 5.7 km, and a population center distance at 7.6 km. Then, the risk for the people residing within the defined boundaries of the facility was estimated for both an aircraft crash accident and an on-site transportation accident.
On-site transportation
For on-site transportation, initiating events are classified into mechanical and thermal events [4] . Mechanical events include drop of the transfer cask, drop of the storage cask, and strikes from heavy objects. Meanwhile, thermal events include fire from diesel fuel in the mobile truck or cask transporter, and fire from aircraft fuel. Although some initiating events can lead to serious consequences, some of them cannot cause the release of radioactive material. Whereas other initiating events leading to release of radioactive material, such as a seismic event and aircraft crash, account for 1.73% of total risk, drop accidents for all processing stages generate almost the whole of the risk for on-site transportation. Therefore, because of its high risk, only a drop accident was considered in the accident scenario. Based on the on-site transportation process, an event tree was constructed, as shown in Fig. 6 ; a drop accident was assumed to be possible in every processing stage.
Land transportation usually implies city-to-city transportation; however, for this study, land transportation was restricted to site-to-wharf transportation. Based on a previous study, a procedure was provided for on-site transportation [4] . As shown in Table 1 , 23 processing stages were considered and categorized according to their characteristics. All of the processing stages had horizontal or vertical processing directions. For an accident associated with a horizontal processing stage, a single height was considered as the accident height, whereas a range of heights was applied to an accident associated with a vertical processing stage. For the on-site transportation scenario, dropand-collision accidents were considered in the analysis. The probability of these accidents was calculated for each stage and sequence, whereas the consequence was calculated for each sequence.
The probability for each stage was obtained from historical statistical data [4, 45] . The drop probability for the fuel assembly was used for the spent fuel assembly; from 1968 to 2002, this accident occurred 11 times in 344,000 movements. Therefore, the probability was 3.2 Â 10 À5 . The drop probability of the cask during the processing steps was 5.6 Â 10 À5 because a drop occurred three times in 54,000 events from 1968 to 2002. The resulting drop probability of the cask during transportation was 3.3 Â 10
À8
. The calculation methods for the consequences of on-site transportation were the same as those used for an aircraft crash accident. Thus, the release fraction was calculated from the leakage area and the reference data, and the release fraction was combined with meteorological data to calculate the consequences. The impact energy, which directly affects the leakage area for the consequence analysis, was calculated using the ABAQUS/EXPLICIT model, similar to the case of the aircraft crash accident. Fig. 7 shows an example of the analysis model. 
Risk assessment software composition
The software RATS was developed to conveniently analyze the three accident scenarios described above. Each analysis in this software is treated as a project; a project consists of accidents; and each project can include one or more accidents, which are the smallest analysis units. After creating an accident, the screen is divided into three sections: input, result, and summary. In the input section, users decide the accident conditions. According to these conditions, the software imports data from the database that are then embedded in the software. Then, after the analysis, the results are shown in the result and summary sections. The accident type must be selected from the beginning among the three options: maritime transportation, aircraft crash into a spent fuel ISF, and onsite transportation.
Maritime transportation
For a maritime transportation accident, users can freely create a route on the map. The support software, linked to RATS, can be used to create a route and to perform the probability calculation for that route. Users can select the ship velocity and cask arrangement in this support software. Then, the created route and the probability calculated from the support software are saved as a text file that is read by RATS. A frame of the support software and the text file format are shown in Fig. 8 .
The accident scenario developed in this study is embedded as a default event tree. However, users can modify the accident scenario using an implanted dll file of AIMS, a software that was developed by the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute. Therefore, users can edit the event tree in the same manner as they edit AIMS. Then, the characteristics of the spent fuel, the cask, and the nuclides are selected for the consequence analysis. In this software, two fuel types (WH 17 Â 17 and CE 16 Â 16), one burnup (45,000 MWd/MTU), one enrichment (4.5 wt.%), and two cooling times (5 and 10 years) are provided as options for the spent fuel characteristics. For the cask, two capacities (18 and 21 fuel assemblies) and eight quantities of sinking casks (1e8 casks) are provided as options. A single cask loading is chosen according to capacity. Finally, users can select a maximum of five types of nuclides from among the 52 nuclides available. The leach time is set to 1,000 years, with a leach constant of 0.1/y. All of these options can be modified by users; however, users must supply the input data for all user-defined cases.
The analysis results for each cell and each event tree are shown in the results section, along with the imported probabilities and the consequences. Because there was no cask damage for any of the states other than a sinking accident, the other accident types have zero consequence. Using Eq. (1), the risk is automatically calculated and shown in the risk column. In addition, the selected conditions and the results are summarized in the summary section. The overall summary of the accident is shown at the end of the summary section. Useful information such as the total cask damage probability, consequence, and risk is also included in this section. Furthermore, the number of cells that result in the highest risk, the cell location where the probability of cask damage is the highest, and the number of cells with the highest consequences are identified.
Aircraft crash into a spent fuel ISF
Analyzing an aircraft crash into a spent fuel ISF requires six inputs: the accident location, the concrete type, the wall thickness, the accident scenario, the consequence result specifications, and the spent fuel specifications. A reference location was assumed for the accident location. An ISF is protected by a concrete wall that is defined by two characteristics: concrete type (C14, C16, C20, C25, C30, or C35) and wall thickness (ranging from 70 to 120 cm at 5-cm intervals). Similar to the maritime transportation scenario, this accident scenario was embedded in the software; however, users also have the freedom to modify the scenario. Distances and directions are required to set the criteria for the consequence analysis; three distances (560 m, 5.7 km, and 7.6 km) and 17 directions (N, NNE, NE, ENE, E, ESE, SE, SSE, S, SSW, SW, WSW, W, WNW, NW, NNW, and direction independent value) can be selected in the software. With the direction independent value, the risk will be the most conservative because it considers only wind speed without direction. Finally, one fuel type (CE 16 Â 16), three burnups (25,000, 45,000, and 60,000 MWd/MTU), one enrichment (4.5 wt.%), one cooling time (10 years), and one quantity of fuel assemblies (21 fuel assemblies) are provided as options for the spent fuel characteristics. The number of casks can be freely selected by the user. These parameters are shown in Fig. 9 .
Similar to the maritime transportation scenario, for this case, the software imports the probabilities and consequences from a database. The risk is calculated using the imported values and Eq.
(1). The other information in the result and summary sections is the same; however, the result summary part in the summary section is different. To analyze an aircraft crash into a spent fuel ISF, only the total risk and the highest risk sequence are reported in the summary section.
On-site transportation
The settings for the accident conditions and the analysis process for the on-site transportation scenario are almost the same as those for an aircraft crash into a spent fuel ISF. The location of the accident, the event tree, the consequence result specifications, and the spent fuel specifications are required for the analysis. A stage height setting is also required, and the on-site transportation process is categorized according to the height of the stage. There are 23 stages for on-site transportation, each with a different processing height. Because the heights of stage 7 and 12 are zero, these two stages are excluded from the analysis. Users can select the height of each step within its boundary; the other settings are the same as those for an aircraft crash into a spent fuel ISF. The settings are shown in Fig. 10 . After analysis, the imported probabilities, the consequences, and the calculated risks are shown in the results section. Two states from among the 22 sequences show zero risk because they have zero consequences. The composition of the summary section is approximately the same as that of the aircraft crash into a spent fuel ISF; the only difference is that the stage heights are included for this scenario.
Sensitivity studies using software
The software used in this study was designed to assess the risk associated with spent fuel transportation and storage for any accident conditions set by the user. In this section, using the developed software, the risks for three different accident scenarios with various accident conditions were analyzed. For maritime transportation, the analysis was performed for varying routes. The route travel distances differed, but they had the same start and end points. Analyses with different accident conditions for building strength and handling strategy were performed for an aircraft crash into an ISF and for on-site transportation. Regulators or others who are interested in the risk associated with spent fuel transportation can use this software effectively because users can model a theoretical accident with any reasonable conditions and assess the corresponding risk.
Route comparison
Three routes were tested as examples for maritime transportation. All three routes have the same start and end points, but different travel distances. The closer a route is to the shoreline, the shorter the route becomes. Short routes and long routes have different characteristics: a short route has a high accident probability because it has a high chance of intersecting with other ships in a short distance. Near the shoreline, many ships use ports, which is a source of high accident probability; a short route close to the shoreline has a high intersection density. However, a long route could also have a high accident probability because of its long travel distance. A long trip allows many chances for the transport ship to collide with other ships. Therefore, even though a long route has a low intersection density, it could have a high accident probability. Three routes with different distances were considered to determine the effect of distance from the shoreline. The accident conditions are shown in Table 2 .
The results of the analysis are summarized in Table 3 . Even though the three routes had the same start and end points, each route resulted in a different risk. Although the longest route had the lowest risk, the risk did not gradually decrease with increasing route length. The number of cells that result in the most risk, the cell location where the probability of cask damage is the highest, and the number of cells with the highest consequence also varied among the three routes. Therefore, the route location had a greater effect on risk than did the route length.
The risks of cells near the southeast coast (44, 45, 55 , and 56) were high because of the high probability of collision. The shippassing density in this area is high because the area has one of the largest ports in Korea. Therefore, avoiding this area is a good option for reducing the total risk. Avoiding the regions containing cell numbers 40, 49, and 48 can also be a good option for reducing consequences. Based on the open sea scenario, which had the lowest risk among the three examples, an optimized route was created, as shown in Fig. 11 . During optimization, the accident probability and consequence of each cell were considered. The risk of this route was 2.29 Â 10 À02 mSv/transportation, and the risk decreased by 29.11% compared with that of the intermediate sea scenario, which had the highest risk. The number of cells that result in the most risk, the cell location where the probability of cask damage is the highest, and the number of cells with the highest consequences were 44, 25, and 54, respectively.
Risk comparison for building characteristics
Concrete type and wall thickness were the independent variables used to compare the risk for the building characteristics. Other control variables are shown in Table 4 . The three cases had different containment wall strengths. The analysis results according to the independent variables are shown in Table 5 and Fig. 12 .
As expected, the strongest wall had the lowest risk. In addition, because of the meteorological data used, the east direction had the lowest risk for all three examples, whereas the west direction had the highest risk. Increasing the wall strength can reduce the risk of an aircraft crash into a spent fuel ISF. The strongest wall decreased the risk by 83.21% compared with the weakest wall. Therefore, making a strong wall is a good strategy for reducing risk.
Risk comparison for a spent fuel handling environment
Similar to the previous scenarios, Table 6 shows the control variables and Table 7 shows the independent variables for the onsite transportation scenarios. The heights of the stages were the only independent variable for this analysis. In addition, the directional risks are shown in Fig. 13 .
The accident that occurred at the lowest stage height had the lowest risk; this result may be the result of a second collision. The analysis results showed that the impact energy of a second collision was more serious than the impact energy of the first collision because of the rotation energy and the increased acceleration. This impact resulted in a high consequence for on-site transportation. Considering a direction independent value, the risk was 26.72% smaller than that of the highest stage height accident. The effect of direction on the risk was the same as that for the previous analysis. Therefore, spent fuel processing for transportation must be executed at as low a height as possible to reduce the on-site transportation risks. If reducing the height is not possible, an impact buffer on the floor can reduce the effect of the impact. 
Conclusions
In this study, a probabilistic-based approach was proposed for analyzing the risks of spent fuel transportation and storage, and the risks were assessed using developed software that considered three accident scenarios with varying accident conditions. For maritime transportation, the image-processed results of the automatic identification system data were used, and the ship was modeled using FEM to calculate the collision probability. A consequence Fig. 11 . Optimized route for maritime transportation based on the example cases. Table 7 Analysis results for on-site transportation.
Analysis conditions Default elevation
Highest elevation
Lowest elevation
Height of each stage (m) analysis code was used to reflect the characteristics of the Korean ocean. For an aircraft crash into an ISF and for on-site transportation, a statistical distribution and historical data were used to calculate the accident probabilities. Then, structural analysis using FEM was used to assess the consequences. To reduce risk effectively, an optimized route for maritime transportation was proposed, and wall characteristics and a spent fuel handling strategy were suggested for an aircraft crash into an ISF and for on-site transportation, respectively. The analysis results can be changed according to the accident conditions, and a parametric analysis of the accident conditions can be performed using the software developed in this study. Users can also modify the default accident options to suit specific applications; therefore, the software can be used for various purposes.
However, there are several limitations to this research. First, the models used in this analysis have their own limitations. For maritime transportation, the credibility of the consequence analysis is relatively low because of a lack of input data and high model uncertainty. Although this model was modified for local ocean modeling, the model itself still contains aleatory uncertainty, whereas the input data contain epistemic uncertainty. For aircraft crash into a spent fuel ISF and for on-site transportation, a typical Gaussian plume model was used because the research scope of this study is not to pursue the accuracy of consequence analysis but to suggest an integrated and automated framework for risk analysis of spent fuel transportation and storage. Once a specific site location for a spent fuel ISF is decided, upgrading the dispersion model to the PUFF or Lagrangian model will be helpful to increase the accuracy of the consequence analysis allowing it to consider geographical features and local wind pattern.
In addition, the cell size for the consequence analysis of maritime transportation is too large to obtain detailed modeling results near the coast, so other dispersion models that do not require compartments can be used in future studies. Therefore, more accurate consequence analysis can be achieved by adopting more accurate input coefficients and replacing the compartment model with a free surface circulation model. Moreover, localization limitations exist for the input data and the methods. Because there have been no studies on the probabilistic risk assessment of spent fuel transportation and storage in Korea, the methods and input data were obtained from research performed abroad. Although many values were appropriately modified and new methods were developed, further improvements can still be made. More research results are required for these improvements.
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